http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/20
Yesterday I participated in a "Room for Debate" discussion on airport security profiling. Nothing I haven't said before.
Daily - Fruits - Whole Grains - Leafy Greens - Nuts - Carrots - Green Tea 3 times a week - Oily Fish - Yogurt - Broccoli - Sweet Potato - Avocado Once a week - Red meat - Pasta - Dessert - Alcohol NEVER! - Fast Food - Soda - Processed meals/frozen dinners - Canned soup - "Diet" anything Eat breakfast every day, no exceptions.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/20
"Unpredictable" security as applied to air passenger screening means that sometimes (perhaps most of the time), certain checks that might detect terrorist activity are not applied to some or all passengers on any given flight. Passengers can't predict or influence when or whether they are be subjected to any particular screening mechanism. And so, the strategy assumes, the would-be terrorist will be forced to prepare for every possible mechanism in the TSA's arsenal, effectively narrowing his or her range of options enough to make any serious mischief infeasible.But terrorist organizations -- especially those employing suicide bombers -- have very different goals and incentives from those of smugglers, fare beaters and tax cheats. Groups like Al Qaeda aim to cause widespread disruption and terror by whatever means they can, even at great cost to individual members. In particular, they are willing and able to sacrifice -- martyr -- the very lives of their solders in the service of that goal. The fate of any individual terrorist is irrelevant as long as the loss contributes to terror and disruption.
Paradoxically, the best terrorist strategy (as long as they have enough volunteers) under unpredictable screening may be to prepare a cadre of suicide bombers for the least rigorous screening to which they might be subjected, and not, as the strategy assumes, for the most rigorous. Sent on their way, each will either succeed at destroying a plane or be caught, but either outcome serves the terrorists' objective.
The problem is that catching someone under a randomized strategy creates a terrible dilemma for the authorities. What do we do when we detect a bomb-wielding terrorist whose device was discovered through the enhanced, randomly applied screening procedure?
EDITED TO ADD (1/5): In this blog post, a reader of Andrew Sullivan's blog argues that the terrorist didn't care if he blew the plane up or not, that he went back to his seat instead of detonating the explosive in the toilet precisely because he wanted his fellow passengers to see his attempt -- just in case it failed.
http://www.nin.com/newspost/2010/01/nin-f
Our 2008 Lights In The Sky tour was an ambitious multimedia production on a scale well beyond anything we'd ever attempted before. Everyone involved was extremely proud of how it came together, and we were devastated when, for a variety of reasons, we were unable to capture it professionally for a theatrical or commercial release. As a "plan B" of sorts, early last year we released a massive 405gb free download of raw HD footage captured at three different shows during the tour. The idea was to get the footage out in the wild and see what our notoriously enterprising fans could do with it. There were no rules. No strings attached. This was a gift, and an experiment, and for the past year we've watched it come to life in more ways than we could have ever imagined.http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/20
I've been reading a lot recently -- like this one on the Israeli airport security model, and how we should adopt more of the Israeli security model here in the U.S. This sums up the problem with that idea nicely:
On the other hand, no matter how safe or how wonderful the flying experience on El Al, it is TINY airline by U.S. standards, with only 38 aircraft, 46 destinations, and fewer than two million passengers in 2008. As near as I can tell, Cairo is their only destination in a majority Muslim country. Delta, before the Northwest merger is included, reported 449 aircraft and 375 destinations.Ben Gurion Airport is Israel’s primary (not only) international gateway. In 2008, Ben Gurion served 11.1 million international passengers and 470,000 domestic passengers, roughly comparable to the 10 million total served at Sacramento, the airport I use most often. Amsterdam served 47.4 million total, and Detroit served 35.1 million total in 2008.
By American standards, in terms of passengers served, Ben Gurion is a busy regional airport.
Simply put, the Israeli airport security model does not scale.
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